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Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly, 
i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe 
identification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The main 
design feature is that each subject simultaneously is a member of two randomly assigned and 
economically identical groups where only members (‘neighbors’) are different. In both groups 
subjects make contribution decisions to a public good. We speak of social interactions if the 
same subject at the same time makes group-specific contributions that depend on their 
respective neighbors’ contribution. Our results are unambiguous evidence for social 
interactions. A majority of subjects is very strongly influenced by the contributions of their 
respective neighbors. Roughly ten percent exhibit no social interactions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a long-standing and fundamental problem of the social sciences to understand 
whether and how humans are influenced by the behavior exhibited by the members of the 
social group they belong to. There is now mounting evidence that neglecting such social 
interactions (or peer and neighborhood effects) hinders a proper understanding of important 
economic and social problems: Among other phenomena, social interactions determine 
criminal behavior [Glaeser, Scheinkman and Sacerdote 1996], affect the dynamics of urban 
poverty and crime [Case and Katz 1991; Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield 2001; Katz, Kling, 
and Liebman 2001], influence welfare participation [Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 
2000] and work place behavior [Ichino and Maggi 2000; Falk and Ichino 2003] and have an 
impact on academic success [Sacerdote 2001].  
Identifying social interaction effects with the usually available field data has proved to be 
notoriously difficult [Manski 1993, 2000; Akerlof 1997; Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001]. 
Among the problems that need to be solved are (i) identifying the reference group for which 
social interaction effects are sought to be established (e.g., by identifying language networks as 
in Bertrand et al. [2000]), (ii) circumventing the problem of self-selection of group members by 
investigating randomly composed groups (e.g., Sacerdote [2001]), (iii) controlling for 
correlated effects that affect all group members in a similar way, and (iv) controlling for 
contextual effects like exogenous social background characteristics of group members. The 
latter two problems require very rich data sets, possibly at the individual level (see, e.g., Ichino 
and Maggi [2000]). 
In this paper we take a different route than the papers discussed above and provide a 
laboratory experiment to study the phenomenon of social interactions. We argue that the 
experimental laboratory provides the researcher with a valuable tool to study social interactions 
because it guarantees more control than any other available data source. The ideal data set 
would observe the same individual at the same time in different neighborhoods, which are 
identical – apart from different neighbors. Obviously, this is impossible in the field. By 
contrast, in the lab it is possible to come very close to this ‘counterfactual state’. In our 
experiment, we are able to observe decisions of the same subject at the same time in two 
economically identical environments. The only reason to behave differently in these two 
environments is social interactions, i.e., the fact that a person is systematically affected by the 
behavior of his neighbors in the two environments. Our design therefore circumvents the 
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above-mentioned identification problems. Using the terminology of Manski [2000], in our 
study reference groups are well-defined; the set-up avoids the self-selection problem; subjects 
make decisions in two economically identical environments, which controls for correlated 
effects; the decision problem is abstractly framed and decisions are taken anonymously, which 
avoids contextual effects. Moreover, our laboratory approach has the added advantage of 
minimizing measurement errors.  
The decision variable in the two environments (group 1 and group 2) is a voluntary 
contribution to a standard linear public good. We have chosen a public goods environment 
mainly because many economically important decisions that are potentially affected by social 
interactions are characterized by external effects, such as compliance with social norms or 
behavior at the workplace. These decisions can be modeled as public goods games. We speak 
of ‘social interactions’ if subjects differentiate their contributions depending on their 
neighbors’ contributions in their respective groups.  
Our data lend strong and unambiguous support for the importance of social interactions: 
The same subject contributes more to group 1 than to group 2 if the average contributions of 
his neighbors in group 1 are higher than those of the neighbors in group 2 and vice versa. 
Econometric analysis reveals further that behavior of neighbors in group 2 has only a very 
limited impact on decisions in group 1 and vice versa.  
We also analyze behavior at the individual level and find that most subjects exhibit 
strong social interaction effects in their contribution behavior. Yet there is substantial 
individual heterogeneity. Roughly ten percent of the subjects display no social interactions at 
all.  
Finally we compare the contribution patterns in the design where subjects are members of 
two groups with the pattern that evolves if subjects are members of only one group. It turns out 
that the contribution patterns are almost identical. This is an important result insofar as it shows 
that the abstraction to study public goods behavior in games where people are only acting in 
one group is a good approximation for the behavior outside the lab where subjects typically 
interact in multiple groups. Our paper therefore contributes to the understanding of social 
interactions as well as to the understanding of voluntary contributions in general. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we will describe our experimental 
designs. Section III contains our hypotheses and Section IV presents the results at an aggregate 
and an individual level. It also contains the comparison of contribution patterns in the designs 
with multiple and single memberships, respectively. Section V concludes. 
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II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
A. Description of the design 
The philosophy and novel feature of our experimental design is to put the same person at 
the same time into two different, yet economically identical environments. Thus, it is only the 
behavior of other neighbors in these environments that can explain possible behavioral 
differences in the two environments. Finding such a different behavior is therefore evidence for 
social interactions. 
The implementation of the ‘two neighborhood’ design was straightforward (see Figure I): 
Nine subjects formed a so-called matching group. Within such a matching group, all subjects 
were simultaneously members of two neighborhoods called ‘groups’. Subjects were told that 
they were members of a ‘group 1’ and a ‘group 2’ (see the instructions in the Appendix). The 
two groups were formed such that each subject had two different neighbors in each group. For 
example, in Figure I, subject 4 formed a group with subjects 1 and 7 and another group with 
subjects 5 and 6.1 Likewise, subject 9 formed a group with subjects 3 and 6 and another group 
with subjects 7 and 8. 
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FIGURE I 
OUR TWO-GROUP DESIGN 
Note: Numbers represent different subjects in the experiment. 
 
Within each of the two groups subjects had to make a contribution to a standard linear 
public good. We chose a public goods environment for two reasons. First, many economically 
                                                 
1. In the experiment subjects had no labels. We use the numbering of subjects in Figure I only for expositional 
reasons. 
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important decisions that are potentially affected by social interactions are characterized by 
external effects, like tax compliance, compliance with social norms or behavior at the 
workplace. This type of situations can be modeled as public goods games (see, e.g., Coleman 
[1990]). Second, our design is biased against finding a social interaction effect, since, as we 
show below, the unique strict equilibrium of the stage game (under standard preferences) is one 
in dominant strategies.  We would like to point out, however, that the general idea of the two-
group design is not confined to public goods games. Our two-group design can be applied in 
other contexts as well, e.g., in coordination games. Social interactions in games with multiple 
equilibria would imply that the same subject coordinates on different equilibria, depending on 
the respective neighbors’ behavior. 
The public goods of the two groups were technologically completely independent of each 
other. Each subject was endowed with 20 tokens in each group and could invest up to 20 tokens 
into the public good of the respective group. Let 1iG  be the set of the members of player i’s 
group 1 and let 2iG  be the set of the members of player i’s group 2. For example, individual 4 
from Figure I lives in the two neighborhoods { }7,4,114 =G  and { }6,5,424 =G . Let 1ic  ( 2ic ) denote 
i’s voluntary contribution to group 1 (group 2). For both groups the following budget 
constraints had to hold: 200 1 ≤≤ ic  and 200 2 ≤≤ ic . If a subject decided, e.g., to invest 10 
tokens in group 1 she could nevertheless only invest at most 20 tokens in group 2. Any token 
not invested in the public good of the respective group was automatically invested into a 
private good. Thus, for each subject i the payoff function was as follows: 
 
(1)    ,)20()20(
3
22
3
11
21
∑∑
∈∈
+−++−=
ii Gk
ki
Gj
jii cccc ααpi  
where j and k are indices for neighbors of group 1 and group 2, respectively. In our experiment, 
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free ride completely, while total payoffs are maximized if everybody fully invests into the 
group account.  
Subjects were randomly allocated to the groups and remained paired for 20 periods. The 
subjects knew this. At the beginning of each period, subjects had to make their contribution 
decisions for both public goods on the same screen. The screen was separated into two vertical 
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parts (called ‘group 1’ and ‘group 2’) and contained an input box for each group. On the same 
screen where subjects had to make their simultaneous contribution decisions, subjects were 
also informed for both group 1 and group 2 about (1) the average contribution of all respective 
group members (2) their respective incomes in the previous period and (3) the respective 
average group contribution over all previous periods. Full anonymity between subjects was 
maintained throughout the whole experiment. The experiment was computerized using the 
experimental software z-Tree [Fischbacher 1999]. 
The novel feature of our two-group experiment is that subjects are simultaneously 
members of two groups. This design feature is without precedent, which is remarkable because 
in reality multiple memberships are the rule rather than the exception. People are, e.g., at the 
same time taxpayers and voters, or members of different sports clubs and so on. It is an 
interesting and open question whether the fact of being in various groups vs. being just in one 
group systematically produces different contribution behaviors. If this were true, many findings 
of the experimental public goods literature would be in question. 
In order to compare contribution patterns in the two-group design with behavior in a 
standard public goods game, we also conducted a standard single-group linear public goods 
experiment with three group members (‘one-group’ design). This experiment was exactly the 
same as our two-group design except that subjects were only members of a single-group and 
got only information about the average contribution of their group members. The payoff 
function was exactly the same as (1), except that there was only one public good to which they 
could contribute and from which subjects received a payoff.  
 
B. Discussion of the two-group design 
The purpose of our study is to identify social interaction effects, which requires extensive 
control. We argue that a laboratory environment allows a degree of control, which is 
impossible to reach in the field.  
First, we control for any self-selection effect. This is achieved by the fact that subjects 
were randomly allocated to their groups and that we observe the same subject’s behavior in two 
different groups. Even without random allocation, this latter feature alone circumvents self-
selection problems.  
Second, we control for correlated effects, i.e., for the possibility that neighborhood 
characteristics influence behavior [Manski 1993]. In our experiment the two environments in 
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which subjects make their decisions are economically exactly identical. In each group all 
subjects have the same action space, the same endowment and budget constraint, the same 
information conditions and the same material incentives. Both groups are completely 
independent of each other, i.e., a decision in group 1 does not change the endowment, the 
action space or the incentives in group 2. Moreover, groups are equal in size and each neighbor 
faces the same economic incentives. The two-group design also controls for correlated effects 
that might be caused by the fact that different sessions are conducted at different dates and 
times. Even more importantly, it controls for experience and learning. When a subject decides 
how much to contribute to the two groups she has exactly the same experience for both 
decisions. This cannot be achieved in a one-group design.  
Third, we control for contextual effects, i.e., for the fact that a person may show a 
different behavior in the two groups because of the socio-economic composition of the two 
groups [Manski 1993]. Control in this respect is ensured by the fact that experimental subjects 
were very homogenous with respect to their socio-economic background and, more 
importantly, interaction was anonymous.  
Fourth, while in the field one can only hypothesize about the relevant group of 
comparison and try to find some good proxy (language group, neighbors of the same block, zip 
code etc.) the lab environment controls the available information. Subjects receive information 
only about the behavior of those groups they actually belong to. This implies, e.g., that subjects 
cannot compare to any other group.2 Fifth, our computerized lab environment excludes 
measurement errors. 
 
C. Procedures 
In total, 174 subjects participated in our experiments. In the two-group design 126 
subjects, who made 5040 contribution decisions, took part. They formed 14 independent 
matching groups of nine members each (see Figure I). In the one-group experiments 48 
subjects participated who formed 16 independent groups. No subject participated in more than 
one treatment. The experiments were conducted in the computer lab at the University of St. 
Gallen. Most subjects were first-semester undergraduate students of law, economics and 
                                                 
2. Relaxing this information condition could be an interesting treatment condition since it would allow insights 
with whom subjects choose to compare with. This could be implemented, e.g., by giving subjects the possibility to 
inform themselves about the behavior of groups they do not belong to. 
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business administration. None of them had participated in a public goods experiment before. 
After reading the instructions subjects had to solve a set of computerized control questions that 
tested their understanding of payoff calculations.  The experiment started only after all 
participants had answered all questions correctly.  
During the experiments income was counted in ‘Guilders’, which were translated to 
Swiss Francs at the end of the experiment (at an exchange rate of 1 Guilder = 3 Rappen). On 
average, subjects earned 33 Swiss Francs (≈ US$ 22 ≈ B" CCD8" =$%" %E-%(*&%+#5" ,'5#%3"
approximately 70 to 80 minutes. 
 
 
III. HYPOTHESES 
 
We start with the standard economic hypothesis. Under the assumption of rationality and 
selfishness, the standard hypothesis predicts zero contributions to both public goods, i.e., full 
free riding. In the stage games this is obvious since it is a dominant strategy to contribute 
nothing. In our finitely repeated games it holds with backward induction.  
In contrast to the standard economic prediction it is known from many public goods 
experiments that some people cooperate, at least in early periods of an experiment. Is the mere 
fact of observing cooperation in our experiment already an indication for the existence of social 
interaction? The answer to this question depends on the motives and the pattern of cooperation. 
For example, motives like “warm glow” might account for non-zero contributions (see e.g., 
Andreoni [1990], [1995a], [1995b], and Palfrey and Prisbrey [1997]). Likewise simple errors 
may lead to positive contributions. However, both warm glow as well as errors, are 
independent of the contributions of other group members. A person who contributes for reasons 
of warm glow contributes the same amount in both groups, independent of the cooperation 
levels in these groups. To the contrary, social interactions mean that subjects’ contributions are 
affected by the contributions of their neighbors. This conditional cooperation pattern has been 
discussed, e.g., in Sugden [1984], Andreoni [1995b], Croson [1998], Keser and van Winden 
[2000] or Fischbacher et al. [2001]. Applied to our context it requires that the same individual 
contributes more in the neighborhood that has contributed more in the past. 
To state the alternative hypotheses more formally, let 1ic  denote subject i’s contribution in 
period t to group 1 and let 1ig  denote the average contribution of i’s neighbors in group 1 in 
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period t – 1. Analogously, 2ic  denotes subject i’s contribution in period t to group 2 and 2ig  
denotes the average contribution of i’s neighbors in group 2 in period t – 1. Social interactions 
require that corr[( 1ic  – 2ic ), ( 1ig  – 2ig )] > 0, i.e., the larger the contribution difference of the 
neighbors of group 1 and group 2 in the previous period, the larger is the difference in current 
contributions of a group member to the two groups. In contrast, if there are no social 
interactions, we should see no such correlation. This may be the case either if there is full free 
riding ( 1ic  = 2ic  = 0) or if people – e.g., for reasons of a warm glow – are willing to make 
positive contributions to the public good, which are however independent of ( 1ig  – 2ig ). We 
summarize our hypotheses as follows: 
 
NO SOCIAL INTERACTIONS HYPOTHESIS. The difference in the contributions are unrelated to the 
difference in the neighbors’ contributions in the previous period, i.e., corr[( 1ic – 2ic ), ( 1ig  – 
2
ig )] = 0..  
 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS HYPOTHESIS. The larger the difference in contributions of neighbors in 
group 1 and group 2 in the previous period, the larger is the difference in current contributions 
of a group member to the two groups, i.e., corr[( 1ic  – 2ic ), ( 1ig  – 2ig )] > 0. Accordingly, the 
likelihood in the current period to contribute more to group 1 than to group 2 depends 
positively on ( 1ig  – 2ig ) (and vice versa for group 2).  
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
In our discussion of the results we first present data at the aggregate level and for each of 
our fourteen matching groups. We then identify subjects’ individual proclivity for exhibiting 
social interaction effects. We conclude this section by comparing the cooperation patterns in 
our two-group design with those in the single-group design. 
 
A. Aggregate analysis 
Our main result is that the data strongly reject the No Social Interactions Hypothesis in 
favor of the Social Interactions Hypothesis. On average, subjects contribute more to the group 
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that has contributed more in the previous period. Support for this result comes from Figures II 
– IV and Table I. Figure II plots the average difference in current contributions ( 1ic  – 2ic ) as a 
function of the difference of the neighbors’ contributions in the respective groups in the 
previous period ( 1ig  – 2ig ). While the No Social Interactions Hypothesis predicts this graph to 
fluctuate around ( 1ic  – 2ic ) = 0, we find a very strong positive relationship between ( 1ic  – 2ic ) 
and ( 1ig  – 2ig ). Put differently, people tend to contribute more to group 1 than to group 2 (i.e., 
1
ic  > 2ic ) if 1ig  > 2ig  and vice versa. 
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other group members in the previous period (g1 – g2) 
 
FIGURE II  
SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS: DIFFERENCE IN OWN CONTRIBUTION AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
NEIGHBORS’ CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE TWO GROUPS 
 
Figure III looks at the social interaction effects from another angle. As a function of ( 1ig  – 2ig ) 
it shows three graphs, indicating the probability of contributing more to group 1 than to group 
2, more to group 2 than to group 1 and contributing the same in both groups. Figure III is based 
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on all data from all matching groups and uses intervals for ( 1ig  – 2ig ). The intervals were 
determined in a way such that each interval includes roughly the same number of observations. 
For each interval the three graphs add up to a probability of 1. 
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FIGURE III  
THE PROBABILITY OF CONTRIBUTING MORE TO GROUP 1, MORE TO GROUP 2 OR THE SAME 
AMOUNT IN BOTH GROUPS AS A FUNCTION OF ( 1ig  – 2ig ) 
 
Several observations can be made in Figure III. First, the probability of contributing more to 
group 1 than to group 2 is very low if 1ig  < 2ig  and is slightly increasing in ( 1ig  – 2ig ). For 1ig  
– 2ig  = 0, the probability is about 10 percent. For ( 1ig  – 2ig ) > 0 the probability is strongly and 
monotonously increasing in ( 1ig  – 2ig ), reaching roughly 85 percent for high values of ( 1ig  – 
2
ig ). Second, the probability to invest more in group 2 than in group 1 as a function of ( 1ig  – 
2
ig ) is almost exactly the mirror image of the probability to invest more in group 1. Third, the 
probability to contribute the same amount in both groups is the higher the smaller the absolute 
value of ( 1ig  – 2ig ). It reaches its maximum of roughly 85 percent for 1ig  – 2ig  = 0. Note that 
even for very small deviations from 1ig  – 2ig  = 0 (intervals [-2,0) and (0,2]), the probability 
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sharply drops from 85 to about 50 percent. Taken together Figure III strongly supports the 
existence of social interaction. 
Remember that our design involves matching groups of nine subjects. These matching 
groups form the strictly independent observations of our data set. Figure IV looks at our 
hypotheses at the level of matching groups by providing scatter plots of ( 1ic  – 2ic ) as a function 
of ( 1ig  – 2ig ) for each of our fourteen matching groups. 
 
FIGURE IV 
SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEN GROUP 1 AND GROUP 2 PER MATCHING GROUPS 
 
 
The first observation from Figure IV is that the relationship we find at the aggregate level holds 
for all fourteen matching groups. In all our matching groups the bulk of observations is in the 
upper right and the lower left quadrants (defined by ( 1ic  – 2ic ) = 0 and ( 1ig  – 2ig ) = 0). Thus, 
the observation of Figure II is not an artifact of aggregation. Figure IV also reveals that in all 
matching groups there is a certain number of contribution decisions with 1ic  – 2ic  = 0 also for 
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will return to this observation in our analysis of individual behavior.  
In the following we test the statistical significance of the observed social interaction 
effects. As a first test, note that we observe in all 14 matching groups a strictly positive 
correlation between ( 1ic  – 2ic ) and ( 1ig  – 2ig ). With no social interactions the probability of 
finding a strictly positive correlation in one matching group is (slightly smaller than) ½. The 
probability of finding a positive correlation in all 14 matching groups without social interaction 
is therefore smaller than ½14H78777798" I5" '" 5%.0+3" #%5#!" ='2,%" J" K1*(5#" .0,/&+D" (%.0(35" #$%"
results of a robust OLS regression analysis. Since within a matching group contributions are 
not independent, we have calculated robust standard errors that allow for correlated errors 
within matching groups. The dependent variable is ( 1ic  – 2ic ). This variable is regressed on ( 1ig  
– 2ig ), i.e., the difference in neighbor’s contributions in the previous period. To study possible 
time effects, we also include the period index and interact “period” with ( 1ig  – 2ig ).  
The regression strongly supports our previous arguments. The coefficient on ( 1ig  – 2ig ) is 
positive and the robust standard errors are extremely low, which leads to a very high t-value (t 
= 11.25). Moreover, the observed social interaction effect does not vanish with more 
experience, since the interaction term period*( 1ig  – 2ig ) is not significantly different from 
zero.3,4 
So far we have shown that subjects differentiate their contributions according to the 
contributions of their respective neighbors such that corr[( 1ic  – 2ic ), ( 1ig  – 2ig )] > 0 holds. 
However, we have not yet looked at how this positive correlation comes about. In particular it 
is interesting to know whether the behavior of the neighbors in group 2 has an impact on 
contribution behavior in group 1 and vice versa. For example, it could be that the more the 
neighbors contribute in group 2 the less a person is inclined to contribute in group 1. In order to 
study the impact of the neighbors’ contributions in group 1 (group 2) on own contributions in 
group 2 (group 1) we report two further regressions in Table I. 
                                                 
3. Because the groups are identical we expect an intercept of zero (measured by the constant) and we do not expect 
that the intercept will be different from zero in later periods (measured by the variable ‘period’). This is also what 
we observe. 
4. Regressions restricted to single periods provide a further test for the stability of our results over time. For all 
periods, the regressions have a highly significant coefficient for ( 1ig  – 2ig ) and an insignificant constant.  
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TABLE I 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS: EXPLAINING CONTRIBUTIONS WITH THE BEHAVIOR OF NEIGHBORS  
 Dependent variable 
Independent 
variable 
1
ic  – 2ic  1ic  2ic  
1
ig  – 2ig  0.605*** (0.054) 
  
period 0.007 
(0.023) 
-0.103*** 
(0.018) 
-0.121*** 
(0.024) 
period * ( 1ig – 2ig ) 0.005 (0.005) 
  
1
ig  
 0.750*** 
(0.061) 
0.069 
(0.045) 
2
ig   0.021 (0.037) 
0.663*** 
(0.046) 
constant  -0.022 
(0.416) 
2.901*** 
(0.672) 
3.418*** 
(0.776) 
 N=2394 F(3,13)=144.9*** 
R2=0.44 
N=2394 
F(3,13)=101.4*** 
R2=0.46 
N=2394 
F(3,6)=185.0*** 
R2=0.37 
Note: ( 1ic  – 2ic ) measures own difference in contribution to group 1 and group 2 in period t; ( 1ig  – 2ig ) is the 
difference in neighbors’ contributions in group 1 and group 2 in t – 1; *** denotes significance at the 1-percent 
level; robust standard errors clustered on matching groups in parentheses. 
 
The regression in column 2 shows that while the contribution decision in group 1 ( 1ic ) is 
strongly and positively influenced by the behavior of neighbors in group 1 ( 1ig ), the behavior 
of neighbors in group 2 ( 2ig ) has only a slightly positive and clearly insignificant effect. 
Likewise, the third regression model shows that 2ic  is strongly influenced by 2ig but hardly so 
by 1ig .5 In both models the coefficient on ‘period’ is negative and highly significant. This 
indicates the general downward trend in contributions (compare also Figure VI). 
Taken together the regressions in columns 2 and 3 reveal that there are hardly any 
spillover effects from one neighborhood to the other. A subject’s decision to contribute in 
                                                 
5. Note that the correlation between, e.g., 1ic  and 1ig  is not a strict test for the existence of social interactions. 
Finding such a correlation could be due to, e.g., correlated effects with respect to time. If all subjects for whatever 
reason would reduce their contributions from one period to the next we would find such a correlation. In our two-
group design we observe two contribution decisions at the same time, thereby ruling out correlated time effects. 
Ruling out these correlated effects is impossible in a standard one-group design. 
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group 1 is not significantly influenced by the behavior of group 2 neighbors and vice versa. 
This is an interesting result. It suggests that when deciding on an action that affects people in a 
particular group, behavior of this group’s members is very important but behavior of people in 
other groups is largely irrelevant. For example, the willingness of a person to contribute to his 
tennis club may not be affected by the behavior of his fellow soccer club members. As long as 
groups are separated and external effects are confined to a particular group, we expect social 
interactions to be confined to that very group as well. 
 
B. Individual heterogeneity 
In our aggregate analysis we have provided unambiguous evidence for the importance of 
social interaction effects. On average, subjects are very strongly influenced by the contribution 
decisions of their respective neighbors. In this section we study social interactions at the 
individual level. As the preceding figures already suggest, it is not likely that all subjects 
display the same interaction effects. Rather we expect that some subjects are strongly affected 
by social interactions while others are affected to a lesser extent – if at all. Figure V 
investigates this individual heterogeneity. It shows the relative frequency of subjects who 
exhibit a particular intensity level of social interactions. This intensity level is measured with 
simple OLS-regressions for each individual, where 1ic  – 2ic  is regressed on 1ig  – 2ig  for 
periods 2 to 20, setting the constant to zero. Figure V shows the distribution of these 
coefficients, where each individual coefficient is rounded to a multiple of 0.2. A coefficient 
equal to one means that a subject perfectly matches the difference 1ig  – 2ig , while a coefficient 
of zero implies no social interactions. 
Figure V offers several interesting insights. First, 89 percent of the subjects show a 
positive coefficient.  Thus, in line with our previous arguments, the majority of individuals 
shows social interactions. Second, there is pronounced individual heterogeneity, i.e., subjects 
are very differently affected by social interactions. Third, 14 subjects (11 percent) have a 
(rounded) coefficient of zero. Five of these 14 subjects have a coefficient of exactly zero (see 
the light gray part of the column at 0).6 Thus, roughly 11 percent of the subjects show no social 
interactions at all.  
                                                 
6. Of these five subjects three are completely selfish, i.e., they always defect while two always contribute 
independently of the other group members’ decisions. 
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The finding of two classes of subjects, those whose behavior is influenced by the 
behavior of their neighbors and those whose behavior is independent of others is consistent 
with the assumption put forward in Glaeser et al. [1996]. In their model there is a group of 
agents whose decision to become criminal is influenced by the behavior of their neighbors 
while others, the so-called ‘fixed agents’, are affected by others. 
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Rounded regression coefficients (c1-c2 on g1-g2) for each individual (periods 2 to 20) 
 
FIGURE V 
SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
 
C. Social interactions and cooperation patterns 
In this final part of the results section we address the following question: Does the fact 
that subjects are members of two groups significantly affect their contribution behavior? This is 
an important question since in reality everybody is usually a member of more than one group. 
Yet, to our knowledge, all public goods experiments performed so far, study the contribution 
behavior of subjects who are members of just one group.7    
                                                 
7. There are some public goods studies where subjects could observe what members of another group contributed 
(e.g., Bardsley and Sausgruber [2003]; Carpenter and Matthews [2003]). In Carpenter and Matthews subjects 
could even punish members of another group. The goal of these studies is different from ours. Bardsley and 
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In order to investigate the impact of multiple memberships we compare the contribution 
patterns of our two-group design with that of a standard one-group design. Parameters in both 
experiments are exactly identical (see Section II). The only difference is that while subjects 
make two decisions in two different groups in the two-group design, they make just a single 
contribution decision in the one-group design. Figure VI shows the evolution of average 
contributions in both treatments by pooling data from all matching groups.  
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FIGURE VI 
COOPERATION PATTERNS IN THE TWO-GROUP AND THE ONE-GROUP DESIGN: AVERAGE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OVER TIME 
 
The result is striking: The contribution patterns between the two treatments are almost 
indistinguishable. In both treatments, average contributions start at about 12 tokens (60 percent 
of the endowment), show a slow downward trend until period 17 and a sharp drop in the final 
three periods. Final average contribution levels are about 3 tokens (15 percent). A Mann-
Whitney test on matching groups reveals that contributions in both treatments are not 
significantly different (p=1.000). 
                                                                                                                                                           
Sausgruber want to disentangle conformism and reciprocity; and Carpenter and Matthews investigate “social 
reciprocity”.  
 17 
The results from Figure VI are very informative. The fact that subjects interact in two 
groups, does not lead to a contribution pattern different from what we usually see in single-
group public goods experiments. The similarity in contribution patterns is in line with our 
findings reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table I. Here we saw that the behavior of neighbors 
from other groups did not significantly influence behavior, i.e., people decide on their 
contributions on a group level. Methodologically this is good news as it shows that the 
abstraction to study public goods behavior in games where people are only acting in one group 
is a good approximation for the behavior in reality, where subject simultaneously interact in 
more than one group.  
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Identifying social interaction effects is a notoriously difficult task [Manski 1993, 2000]. After 
reviewing the problems, Manski [1993, p.541] writes: “The only ways to improve the prospects 
for identification are to develop tighter theory or to collect richer data. (…) Empirical evidence 
may also be obtained from controlled experiments (…). Given that identification based on 
observed behavior alone is so tenuous, experimental and subjective data will have to play an 
important role in future efforts to learn about social effects”.  
In recent years, the availability of rich microeconomic field data sets has led to 
considerable progress.  In the typical field research paper, identifying a social interaction effect 
usually amounts to finding a significant coefficient of the group dummy variables (that capture 
the social groups one is interested in) – after circumventing self-selection problems and after 
controlling in a multiple regression model for variables that arguably capture the most 
important correlated and contextual effects.  Yet, the approach is only indirect: Any variance 
that cannot be attributed to the correlated and contextual effects is attributed to social 
interaction effects.  The problem of omitted variables can never be completely circumvented.  
In our paper we introduce an experimental design that provides us with direct evidence of 
social interaction effects in the context of a public goods game.  The design has the advantage 
that it can be easily applied to other games as well, e.g., games with multiple equilibria.  By 
way of our design we directly control for self-selection, and correlated and contextual effects.  
We have deliberately created an artificial situation in which each subject is a member of two 
separate, yet economically identical groups with different members. This way, we can ensure 
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that each subject simultaneously lives in two identical neighborhoods, where the only possible 
difference is in the behavior of neighbors, but not in the neighborhood characteristics. Given 
our tight control, if we observe the same subject contributing differently depending on what the 
respective neighbors do, we have unambiguous evidence for social interaction effects.  
Our results are clear and unambiguous. First, subjects’ average contribution behavior is 
systematically influenced by social interactions. Subjects contribute more to group 1 than to 
group 2 if the respective neighbors in group 1 contribute more than in group 2 and vice versa. 
Second, our individual data analysis reveals substantive heterogeneity. Subjects’ inclination to 
display social interactions is very different and roughly 10 percent show no social interactions 
at all. Finally we show that the fact that subjects interact in more than one group does not lead 
to a contribution pattern that differs from the one exhibited in a single-group environment. This 
is an important finding from a methodological point of view. It suggests that studying 
contribution behavior in single-group designs is appropriate despite the fact that in reality 
subjects are typically members of many groups. 
On a methodological level, our experiment demonstrates the comparative advantage of 
laboratory experiments in the overarching goal of understanding the phenomenon of social 
interaction effects. We see field and lab data as complements.  Field data sets have the 
advantage over lab experiments that the former are naturally occurring. Yet, even if the field 
data are very detailed, evidence of a social interaction effect is only indirect and the drawback 
remains that in the field one can rarely achieve the tight control that is available in the lab.  The 
lab researcher can even control the game people play, and individual differences can be 
assessed. Both features are valuable tools in getting at the phenomenon of social interactions 
effects. 
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
The following instructions were originally written in German. We document the instructions we 
used in the two-group design. The instructions in the single-group design were adapted 
accordingly. They are available upon request. 
 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment, which has been financed by various science foundations. If 
you read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of 
money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
 
The instructions that we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. It is prohibited to 
communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us. 
If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Francs but rather of Guilders. During the experiment your entire 
earnings will be calculated in Guilders. At the end of the experiment the total amount of guilders you have earned 
will be converted to Francs at the following rate: 
 
1 Guilder = 3 Rappen. 
 
At the end we will pay in cash the money you have earned during the experiment. 
 
The experiment is divided into different periods. In total, the experiment consists of 20 periods. Every participant 
is always a member of two groups (group 1 and group 2). Both groups contain 3 participants, that is, besides you 
there are two further participants in each group. Please notice that the two participants in group 1 are other 
participants than the two participants in group 2. Therefore, besides you there is no further person who is also 
a member of group 1 and of group 2. 
 
The composition of the groups will stay the same during the whole 20 periods. Therefore you will be for 20 
periods with the same participants in group 1 and in group 2. The following pages describe the course of the 
experiment in detail: 
 
 
Detai led Information on the Experiment 
 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 points for group 1 as well for group 2. In the 
following we call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to 
decide in group 1 as well as in group 2, how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to the project and 
how many you want to keep for yourself. 
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Your period income in a group depends on how many points you contribute to the project and how many points 
are contributed to the project by the two other participants. Your income in a group consists of two parts: 
 
(1) The points which you have kept for yourself (“Income from points kept”) whereby 1 point = 1 Guilder, and 
(2) The “income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Your income from the project = 
0.6 x the total contribution of all group members to the project. 
 
Your income per period in group 1 or group 2, respectively, is therefore: 
 
(20 – your contribution to the project) + 0.6*(total contributions to the project). 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way. This means that each group 
member receives the same income from the project. Suppose the sum of contributions of all group members is 50 
points. In this case each group member receives an income from the project of 0.6*50=30 Guilders. If the total 
contribution to the project is 8 points, then each group member will receive an income of 0.6*8=4.8 Guilders from 
the project. 
 
For each point, which you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 Guilder. Suppose you contributed this point 
to the project instead. The total contribution to the project would then rise by one point. Your income from the 
project would rise by 0.6*1=0.6 points. However, the income of each other group member would also rise by 0.6 
points each, so that the total income of the group would rise by 0.6*3=1.8 points. Your contribution to the project 
therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for each point 
contributed by the other members to the project. For each point contributed by any member you earn 0.6*1=0.6 
points. 
 
The calculation of incomes is exactly the same in group 1 and group 2. 
 
At the beginning of each period the following input screen will appear: 
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In the top left corner of the screen appears the period number. In the top right corner there is a clock in seconds. 
It shows how much time remains for you to make a decision on the distribution of your points. 
 
The screen is divided into two parts. On the left, you find the information concerning group 1, and on the right the 
information for group 2. First you can see the amount you have invested into the project in the previous period 
(“Your contribution in the previous period”). Beneath you find the average contribution of the respective group in 
the previous period. If in the previous period the contributions of the three group members have been, for instance, 
10, 15 and 20, the number beside “average group contribution in the previous period” will be 15. Beneath you will 
find your income in the previous period. 
 
A bit further down you can see the “average group contribution of all previous periods”. This number shows the 
total average contribution of all group members of a respective group over all previous periods. If, for example, 
the average contribution in period 1 were 3, in period 2 it were 2 and, e.g., 1 in period 3, in the fourth period the 
number in this line would be 2. The “group average contribution over all previous periods” is therefore a short 
summary of the previous history in a group. The higher the average contribution in a group has been up to now, 
the higher the value in this line will be. 
 
Still a bit further down you can enter your contribution. As already mentioned, your endowment in each of the 
two groups will always be 20 points. You choose in each of the two groups your contribution for each group, by 
entering a number between 0 and 20 in the particular window. You can activate this window with a mouse-click. 
As soon as you have defined both of your contributions, you have also decided how many points you are going to 
keep for yourself, that is to say (20 – your contribution). If you have entered your contribution in both groups, 
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you have to press the OK-button (mouse-click). As long as you have not pressed the OK-button, you can still 
revise your decision in this period. 
 
Please notice: group 1 and group 2 are two totally independent groups. Therefore you can make your 
contribution decisions in group 1 and group 2 absolutely independently from each other, i.e., you decide separately 
for both groups. Your contribution in group 1 can be higher, equal or lower than your contribution in group 
2. You have an endowment of 20 points in each group and each period. 
 
Remark: In the first period your screen contains only the possibility to choose your contribution. Since in the first 
period there is no previous period and therefore further information (like “your contribution in the previous 
period”) cannot yet be shown. 
 
After all group members have made their decisions, a period is over. After that you get back to your input screen. 
On this screen you can see the contributions of the previous period of both groups and your income in both 
groups. You can also see the average contribution of both groups up to now. You can then make your new 
contributions in group 1 and group 2. In total there are 20 periods. Do you have any questions? 
 
Control questionnaire 
Please answer all the questions and write down the whole calculation process. If you have any questions please 
contact us! 
 
1st Question 
In group 1 neither you nor the other participants contribute to the project. 
In group 2 you contribute 20 points and also the other group members contribute 20 points. What is  
Your income in group 1? ... 
The income of the other members in group 1? ... 
Your income in group 2? ... 
The income of the other members in group 2? ... 
 
2nd Question 
In group 1 all the members together contribute totally 30 points to the project. 
In group 2 also all the members contribute totally 30 points to the project. What is  
Your income in group 1, if you contribute 10 points on top of the 30 points? ... 
Your income in group 2, if you contribute 0 points on top of the 30 points? ... 
 
3rd Question 
In group 1 you contribute 16 points to the project. What is 
Your income in group 1, if the other participants contribute 34 points on top of the 16 points? ... 
Your income in group 1, if the other participants contribute 4 points on top of the 16 points? ... 
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